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Abstract 
 
This paper aims to (re)ignite debate about the role of narrative in the medical 
humanities. It begins with a critical review of the ways in which narrative has been 
mobilised by humanities and social science scholars to understand the experience of 
health and illness. I highlight seven dangers or blind spots in the dominant medical 
humanities approach to narrative, including the frequently unexamined assumption 
that all human beings are “naturally narrative.” I then explore this assumption further 
through an analysis of philosopher Galen Strawson’s influential article “Against 
Narrativity.” Strawson rejects the descriptive claim that “human beings typically see or 
live or experience their lives as a narrative” and the normative claim that “a richly 
Narrative outlook is essential to a well-lived life, to true or full personhood.” His work 
has been taken up across a range of disciplines but its implications in the context of 
health and illness have not yet been sufficiently discussed. This article argues that 
“Against Narrativity” can and should stimulate robust debate within the medical 
humanities regarding the limits of narrative, and concludes by discussing a range of 
possibilities for venturing “beyond narrative.” 
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The Limits of Narrative: Provocations 
for the Medical Humanities  
Narrative in the Field of Medicine: Six Uses, Five Debates, Seven 
Dangers 
 
The role of narrative in medicine, and its importance both to clinical practice and to 
understanding the illness experience, has expanded considerably in recent years. Across 
clinical disciplines, as well as in the medical humanities, medical sociology and 
anthropology, narrative is called upon to fulfil an increasingly wide range of functions. 
First and foremost, narrative is understood to provide privileged access to the 
subjective experience of illness, and is frequently promoted as the primary vehicle 
through which the ill person can express her changing sense of self and identity, explore 
new social roles and gain membership of new communities [1-3]. Here, narrative is 
regarded as not merely expressive but as transformative and even therapeutic [4-6]. 
Turning from patient to practitioner, narrative has long been valued for the insights it 
offers into the experience of all those who care for the sick [7-10], but more recently, 
and more radically, “narrative competence” has come to be seen as an essential skill in 
clinical diagnosis and treatment [11-13]. In the sphere of health research, narrative 
offers new methodologies for qualitative and quantitative studies of the illness 
experience [14-17], and at the societal level, narrative is seen by some to challenge the 
hegemony of naturalistic and biomedical approaches to illness and so provide the 
foundation for a new ethics and politics of healthcare [3]. 
 
 
The difficulty of giving precise definitions of narrative [18, p. 1] – and reluctance of 
many to do so – further complicates the ways we can see it in operation in the field of 
medicine. Some have argued that the concept of narrative adds little but academic 
pretention to the experience-near and “probably universal” concept of “story.” As Unni 
Wikan puts it: “people bleed stories, but academics gather narratives” [19, p. 217]. 
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Others reserve the term “story” to denote a sequence of events which are then 
discursively rendered in “narratives,” or argue that “stories” belong to the realm of the 
individual while “narratives” refer to the organizing culturally-variable frameworks 
through which stories are told [20, p. 12]. The concept of “narrativity” – the thick or 
thin, minimal or rich, quality of being narrative – raises further complications for 
plotting the relationship between narratives, stories and events [21]. Scholars working 
in sociology, narratology and psychology continue to debate whether “big” or “little” 
stories give us the richer insights into experience and identity [22-28] and whether the 
most valuable way of engaging with narrative is as “story-analysts” or “story-tellers” 
[17, 29-33]. Some anthropological accounts of narrative emphasise its performative, 
embodied, temporal, and interpersonal dimensions; others, following the lead of literary 
theory, adopt a more semiotic approach to the narrative as text [34, 35]. Amidst this 
diversity of perspectives, methodologies, and scholarly aims (and notwithstanding a few 
notable exceptions [29, 31, 36, 37]) it is frequently the case that a person’s narrative or 
story, however defined, is assumed to be coextensive with their subjective experience, 
their psychological health and indeed their very humanity. 
 
With this in mind, it is not surprising that narrative should enjoy an exceptionally 
privileged role in medical humanities scholarship. Advocates for the use of narrative 
have a commitment to understanding the centrality of the illness experience in the 
medical treatment of disease, taking seriously stories of illness, and valuing the 
individual as the empowered author-narrator of her own story. These goals are, without 
doubt, commendable both in scholarly and practical terms. At the same time, and from a 
broadly sympathetic standpoint, I would argue that there are still some pressing 
questions – seven, to be precise – about the use of narrative in medical humanities 
scholarship which have yet to be comprehensively addressed and so require our 
sustained analytic attention. 
 
(As I hope the reader will have already suspected, this delimitation of seven questions is 
itself something of a provocation. Any attempt to survey an interdisciplinary debate of 
this complexity in a single paper will be obliged to engage a kind of academic shorthand 
against which all sorts of very valid objections can be levelled. Of course, my intention 
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here is not to present a definitive or otherwise closed set of conclusions, but rather to 
(re)ignite critical debate around these topics. I also wish to emphasise the relevance of 
this discussion to the medical humanities in its most inclusive sense: references to 
“narrative in medicine” or “narrative in the field of medicine” should be understood in 
the broadest possible terms to include all aspects of healthcare and the study of health 
and illness.) 
 
 
The first so-called “ethical hazard” [38] routinely encountered in the study of narrative 
in medicine, albeit one that has been agonised over repeatedly, concerns the truth-value 
of narrative. To what extent can we trust that people’s stories of illness faithfully 
describe “what it was really like”? As Mark Freeman has noted in relation to qualitative 
research more broadly, there is “widespread concern that ‘narratives are untrue to “life 
itself”’. Whether this is cause for alarm (the data are distorted!) or celebration (a toast 
to the imagination!) depends on who is offering the critique” [23, p. 132]. The issue of 
whether narratives are “true” of course immediately prompts us to ask “for whom, and 
in what situation?” This in turn calls attention to the uses of narrative, and to a second 
hitherto neglected area of inquiry suggested by the question: “Can narrative coherence 
be a harmful phenomenon, how, and in which context?” [39, p. 7]. As Yiannis Gabriel 
notes, “while stories can be vehicles of contestation, opposition, and self-empowerment, 
they can also act as vehicles of oppression, self-delusions, and dissimulation” [40, p. 
169]. 
 
 
A third danger – more troubling, in my view, if only because it is less frequently 
acknowledged – lies in overinflating what counts as narrative. In some accounts of 
narrative in the field of medicine virtually all forms of creative self-expression, including 
painting, poetry and dance, are included under the “narrative” umbrella [41, p. 1], which 
I think risks mistaking a specific form of primarily linguistic expression for the master-
trope of subjective experience. Related to this is the tendency for some authors to 
collapse distinctions between different narrative forms and contexts. Emphasising the 
continuities between, for example, hospital anecdotes, published autobiographies and 
diagnostic interviews, diverts attention away from systemic analysis of the diverse 
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functions and effects of specific types of storytelling [36]. Fifth, and despite repeated 
efforts to present definitive typologies of illness narratives (as in [3, 42, 43, p. 1840]), a 
sophisticated account of genre is largely absent from literary and semiotic approaches 
to medicine-related and illness narrative. Genre, with its three dimensions of formal 
organization, rhetorical structure and thematic content, is a universal feature of all 
textuality [44], and a careful examination of how it enables and constrains the 
production of certain kinds of narratives in an array of medical and broader cultural 
contexts is, I would argue, overdue.  
 
 
This leads in on to my sixth concern: that scholars and practitioners working with 
narrative in the field of medicine frequently overlook the cultural and historical 
dimensions of narrative form. Too often particular kinds of narrative are presented as 
transcultural, transhistorical truths of the human experience, a view that operates at the 
expense of a more historically and anthropologically grounded approach to 
understanding the cultural specificity of idioms of distress. Arthur Frank’s much-
celebrated book The Wounded Storyteller [3] is a case in point here. Although he writes 
at length about the specific contours of the “postmodern remission society,” Frank turns 
to monomyth, the archetypal story of a hero’s journey, as the ideal narrative form of 
illness experience. With this in mind, the seventh warning I would like to issue is that 
promoting (particular forms of) narrative as the mode of human self-expression, in turn 
promotes a specific model of the self – as an agentic, authentic, autonomous storyteller; 
as someone with unique insight into an essentially private and emotionally rich inner 
world; as someone who possesses a drive for storytelling, and whose stories reflect and 
(re)affirm a sense of enduring, individual identity.  
 
 
These last two dangers direct our attention to the philosophical foundations of 
narrative self-hood and identity and will be the focus of the rest of this paper. The 
literature on narrative and the self comes from psychology, philosophy, sociology, 
literary studies, anthropology, psychiatry and neuroscience; it encompasses memory, 
identity, ethics and emotions; and it seems to be growing exponentially [45]. Rather 
than attempt anything like an overview of this terrain, I want instead to concentrate on 
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philosopher Galen Strawson’s “Against Narrativity”[46], an article which remains at the 
high water mark of critiques of so-called “narrative orthodoxy.” Although his central 
quarrel is with philosophers (as in [47-51]), Strawson has in his sights the narrative 
turn across the humanities and social sciences, and his ideas have been taken up in 
disciplines as diverse as organisational studies, education, and life-writing. Passionate 
and polemical, “Against Narrativity” raises questions which go to the heart of narrative 
in medicine, but which have yet to be adequately addressed by scholars and 
practitioners in the medical humanities. 
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“Against Narrativity” 
 
 “Against Narrativity” begins by identifying two major currents in the tide of 
interdisciplinary interest in narrative: (i) the psychological narrativity thesis, which 
holds “that human beings typically see or live or experience their lives as a narrative or 
story of some sort,” and (ii) the ethical narrativity thesis, which “states that experiencing 
or conceiving one’s life as a narrative is a good thing; a richly Narrative outlook is 
essential to a well-lived life, to true or full personhood” [46, p. 428]. Strawson rejects 
both theses as false: 
 
It’s just not true that there is only one good way for human beings to experience 
their being in time. There are deeply non-Narrative people and there are good 
ways to live that are deeply non-Narrative. [Views which subscribe to the ethical 
narrativity thesis] hinder human self-understanding, close down important 
avenues of thought, impoverish our grasp of ethical possibilities, needlessly and 
wrongly distress those who do not fit their model, and are potentially destructive 
in psychotherapeutic contexts. [46, p. 429] 
 
 
Strawson’s account of the differences between narrative and non-narrative people 
begins with a distinction between two forms of temporal experience. In the diachronic 
mode, “one naturally figures oneself, considered as a self, as something that was there in 
the further) past and will be there in the (further) future” [46, p. 429]. In the episodic 
mode, by contrast, while the capacity to remember past and anticipate future 
experiences remains intact, there is no felt sense of an inner mental entity persisting 
through time. Using himself as an example, Strawson illustrates episodic self-experience 
as follows: 
 
I have a past, like any human being, and I know perfectly well that I have a past. I 
have a respectable amount of factual knowledge about it, and I also remember 
some of my past experiences ‘from the inside’, as philosophers say. And yet I 
have absolutely no sense of my life as a narrative with form, or indeed as a 
narrative without form. Absolutely none. Nor do I have any great or special 
interest in my past. Nor do I have a great deal of concern for my future. [46, p. 
432]  
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Strawson maintains that being diachronic is necessary but not sufficient for being a 
(naturally) narrative person, as “one can be Diachronic without actively conceiving of 
one’s life, consciously or unconsciously, as some sort of ethical-historical-
characterological developmental unity, or in terms of a story, a Bildung or ‘quest’” [46, p. 
441]. Narrativity, then, which for Strawson is the special quality of narrative people, 
requires not just a particular sense of temporally enduring self, but an active drive or 
tendency towards form-finding, story-telling, and revision. 
 
It is important to note here that Strawson’s account of narrativity relates specifically to 
what are elsewhere described as the “big stories” of biographical identity. The idea that 
narrativity is marshalled in the services of the “small stories” of everyday life, such as 
making coffee or recounting the journey to work, Strawson dismisses as trivial. So-
called non-narrative people are, on his model, perfectly capable of understanding events 
sequentially and grasping causal relationships. What they lack is the propensity or 
orientation towards narrativity: the feeling of deep psychological continuity with one’s 
past self married with the desire to frame experience, tell stories, and revise the past. It 
is in the context of structural or foundational self-perception that Strawson moves 
swiftly from seeing narrativity as sometimes useful to condemning it as almost always 
harmful:  
The aspiration to explicit Narrative self-articulation is natural for some – for 
some, perhaps, it may even be helpful – but in others it is highly unnatural and 
ruinous. My guess is that it almost always does more harm than good – that the 
Narrative tendency to look for story or narrative coherence in one’s life is, in 
general, a gross hindrance to self-understanding: to a just, general, practically 
real sense, implicit or explicit, of one’s nature. [46, p. 447] 
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“Against Narrativity” and the Medical Humanities  
 
While Strawson does not rule out the possibility of what could be called mixed types – 
people who have an episodic experience of time but also a strong penchant for form-
finding, or are diachronic but evince no interest in storytelling – critics have been right 
to note that subtlety and nuance are not chief among the virtues of “Against 
Narrativity.” Strawson effectively proposes a dichotomy between episodic-non-
narrative and diachronic-narrative selfhood that is radical, fixed, and thin on 
phenomenological and psychological detail. Philosophers have been quick to 
interrogate the logical foundations and ethical implications of this distinction, and 
Strawson’s broader claims about the injunction to narrate have similarly caught the 
attention and raised the ire of academics in psychology, literary studies and related 
disciplines [52-56]. Rather than offer a comprehensive review of these objections, or 
adjudicate in advance a debate between Strawson and scholars working in the medical 
humanities, I want to argue here for the importance of his and others’ work in 
stimulating a robust discussion about the limits of narrative in our field. In the final 
section of this paper I will outline what I see as some of the most productive topics for 
further analysis. 
 
 
The most obvious starting point for such a discussion is one of narrative medicine’s 
foundational, normative claims: that self-expression through narrative is fundamentally 
healthy and desirable, particularly in the case of illness. As we have already seen, one of 
the most famous expositors of this view is Arthur Frank. According to Frank, the ill 
person is a “narrative wreck” [3, p.54], and it is task of a humane medicine – or, better, a 
humane society – to support the ill person in telling their story. Frank suggests that 
illness narratives can only take a finite number of narrative forms, and his account 
accords pride of place to the “quest narrative” as the form best suited to restoring the ill 
storyteller to her sense of self. Quest narratives can take the shape of memoir, manifesto 
or automythology; what is important is that the ill person becomes, effectively, the hero 
of her own story, such that the creation and performance of narrative is a form of 
testimony which re-claims and re-orients the self. 
11 
 
 
A Strawsonian response to Frank and others’ celebration of illness narrative hardly 
needs elaboration. If the psychological and ethical narrativity theses are false, as 
Strawson argues, then the injunction to narrate is not only misguided but quite possibly 
harmful, particularly for those people who are ‘naturally’ episodic. Frank, in turn, might 
reply that Strawson fundamentally misunderstands both identity and narrative by 
representing them as essentially private, interior affairs. Interlocutors, audiences, co-
authors and communities of meaning are worryingly absent from Strawson’s discussion 
of narrativity, and he offers no insight into the way in which different modes of self-
experience are valued, legitimized and endorsed in different (historical, social, cultural, 
familial, professional) contexts. As I discuss in detail elsewhere [57], the sparks that fly 
from the collision of these diametrically opposed views have the potential to (re)ignite 
long-smouldering debates about the embodied and social significance of illness as well 
as its temporality. Strawson bizarrely asserts that “the fundamentals of temporal 
temperament are genetically determined,” while conceding that “one’s exact position in 
Episodic/Diachronic/Narrative/non-Narrative state-space may vary significantly over 
time” [46, p. 431]. How, and to what extent, does illness alter our temporal and hence 
narrative orientation? Does illness propel us in the direction of diachronicity, forcing us 
to mourn a healthy past which cannot be recuperated and a future which feels more 
fraught, more finite? Or is it the case that illness demands instead that we attend to the 
right now, either because pain returns us to the immediacy of the body, or because the 
uncertainty of the future encourages us to invest more intensely in the self-experience 
of the present? While it seems reasonable to suggest that illness significantly disrupts 
temporal self-experience [58, 59]; Strawson’s work forces us to question whether 
narrative should remain the privileged form for the interpretation or restitution of that 
self-experience.  
 
We need not necessarily follow Strawson in the wholesale rejection of the psychological 
and ethical narrativity theses to realise that there is much to be gained by challenging 
the assumption of their ubiquity and universality. Narrative is not, and never has been, 
innocent; it is not, and never has been, inherently oriented towards the good. A major 
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shift in Frank’s own work has been to foreground the dangers inherent in stories and 
storytelling [60], but for me an even more pressing concern is the assumption of an 
innate a-historical narrative identity upon which his work (and indeed virtually all 
mainstream medical humanities thinking) is based. Writing of narrative psychology, 
Brian Schiff [61, p. 21] states: 
In describing our project as narrative, we are reifying a Western, arguably 
middle and upper class, concept as a universal mode of shaping and articulating 
subjective experience. The narrative metaphor has wide intellectual currency in 
our literature culture where autobiographies and memoirs are common 
technologies for organizing experience, making known our insides, and carving 
out a place for ourselves in the social world. These vehicles are accepted and 
available in our daily life, that’s why the metaphor is so compelling. 
          Our mistake was to think that everyone must be like us.  
Schiff’s observations resonate with Terrence Holt’s observation that “the confessional” 
has now become the “dominant mode of medical discourse” in the West [62, p. 318]. The 
rise of narrative medicine in the clinic and the classroom, the proliferation of doctors’ 
autobiographies and memoirs of illness, the growing number of opportunities and 
incentives for patients to share stories through support groups, in online diaries and 
journals, and even on reality television: while these specific  “technologies of organizing 
experience” as narrative multiply across the field of medicine, we must question the 
extent to which they function to produce Western middle-class, liberal and neo-liberal 
modes of being [19, p. 227, 29, 39, p. 6, 63, p. 3, 64, Ch 2, 65]. Writing in this journal, 
Rebecca Garden has called for narratives of disability to be “taught with a critical 
framework that challenges the individualisation of disability and that identifies and 
resists normative scripts of disability as tragedy and of triumphing over that tragedy 
through a struggle for normalcy” [66, p. 73]. While I agree with Garden that the medical 
humanities can do more to foster a critical approach to the normative scripts of 
particular kinds of narrative, I am arguing, more radically, that our field can also do 
more to highlight the normativity of narrative per se. 
 
Can we do without narrative? Should we discourage patients and doctors from telling 
stories? Should we view with suspicion anyone whose sense of self is articulated in 
narrative terms? Of course not. I am not suggesting that we somehow “do away” with 
narrative. What I am suggesting is that scholars in the medical humanities can do more 
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to denaturalise narrative, to acknowledge not only that different cultures (including 
familial, institutional, and professional cultures) will tell and find meaningful different 
kinds of stories, but also, more fundamentally, that the attachment to and valorisation of 
narrativity is not universally shared [67]. 
 
Beyond Narrative? 
 
“Is there some burden on me to explain the popularity of [the psychological and ethical 
narrativity theses], given that I think that they’re false?” Strawson has asked. “Hardly,” 
comes his swift reply [46, p. 439], indicating his disregard for what in my view is one of 
the most fascinating questions to arise in the study of narrative in the field of medicine. 
Strawson’s evident disinterest in the complex factors giving rise to the narrative turn 
does not detract from the fact that “Against Narrativity” is, as I have already argued, a 
provocative and therefore productive starting-point for recognising the limits of 
narrative. In what might be considered a more positive vein, it also challenges us to 
explore non-narrative ways of understanding and articulating the experience of illness 
and its impact on the self.  
 
So if not narrative, then what? 
 
Space does not permit an extensive discussion of alternatives to narrative which might 
be more amenable to or at least accommodating of episodic self-experience; here, I 
mention only a few examples from the medical humanities in the spirit of stimulating 
further inquiry. In his work in transcultural psychiatry and medical anthropology, 
Lawrence Kirmayer has argued persuasively that metaphor “occupies an intermediate 
ground between embodied experience and the overarching narrative structures of 
plots, myths, and ideologies”: 
Just as fragments of poetry can be written with no overarching narrative, or only 
the briefest strand hinted at, so can we articulate our suffering without appeal to 
elaborate stories of origins, motives, obstacles, and change. Instead, we may 
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create metaphors that lack the larger temporal structure of narrative but are no 
less persistent and powerful. Such fragments of poetic thought may be the 
building blocks of narrative: moments of evocative and potential meaning that 
serve as turning points, narrative opportunities, irreducible feelings and 
intuitions that drive the story onward. [68, p. 155, 69] 
 
We can only find “a way into the making and breaking of narrative” in clinical settings if 
we attend first “to what is unfinished, incomplete, and tentative – the myriad forms of 
‘nonnarrative’ communication” including all the dimensions of embodied interaction 
[68, p 174]. Philosophy and specifically phenomenology can also offer a way of grasping 
the transformations – subtle and profound – to embodiment and ‘enworldedness’ in 
illness [59, 70]. The “Phenomenological Toolkit for Patients” currently being developed 
by philosopher Havi Carel has the potential to offer patients new resources for framing 
and communicating their experiences in ways which do not presuppose an orientation 
towards storytelling or narrative self-presentation. Drawing on the work of Merleau-
Ponty and Husserl, Carel aims to provide patients with the tools to undertake their own 
philosophical reflection; at the same time, her workshops will use a range of media, 
including film and music, to encourage non-linguistic forms of self-expression. A third 
example, this time from the visual arts, also reminds us that language is not the only 
medium for communicating matters of medicine, health, and illness. Photographer 
Deborah Padfield’s work on visualizing pain is a strong example of how creative 
processes structured around images, visual symbols, and spatial composition can have 
profound therapeutic effects as well as produce powerful aesthetic works [71].  
 
The work of Kirmayer, Carel, and Padfield suggests that metaphor, phenomenology, and 
photography might be useful ‘ways in’ to the meanings of experience generally and of 
illness specifically; avenues of exploration which might well intersect with or contribute 
to narrative but do not take storytelling as starting-point or telos. As Paul Ulhas 
Macneill shows in his article on the challenging relationship between art and medicine 
[72], the work of body-modifying, cyborgian performance artists Stelarc and Orlan 
suggests even more innovative and extreme ways of exploring the discontinuities and 
disruptions of embodied self-experience. Their performances, and postmodern and 
posthuman theory with which they are in dialogue, resist the principle comforts of 
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narrative – continuity, closure and containment – in the pursuit of the paradoxical, the 
ambiguous and undecidable.  
 
Mark Freeman has observed that “Whether we’re narrativists or antinarrativists, the 
pressure for meaning, for significance, remains much the same” [73, p. 175]. The final 
point I wish to consider is the extent to which being “against narrativity” actually 
encompasses a deeper resistance towards this pressure, this imperative to find life 
meaningful? In his polemical book End of Story: Toward an Annihilation of Language and 
History, philosopher Crispin Sartwell reminds us that:  
Narrative comes apart at the extremes…it comes apart in ecstasy, in writhing 
pain, at death. But it has already also come apart everywhere, all the time, 
wherever people are breathing, or walking around, or watching TV, and not 
getting anywhere narratively speaking. What narrative is inadequate to is not 
just the shattering moment, but the moment of indifference….Pull yourself away 
from significance for a moment and let yourself feel the sweet, deep, all-
enveloping insignificance all around you. And take comfort in your own 
insignificance; take comfort in the triviality of your culture; take comfort in the 
triviality of your life-project and your failure in realizing it. [67, p. 65] 
Sartwell’s work, like Strawson’s, may not ultimately prove comforting to many in the 
field of the medical humanities, but the discomfort it produces I hope would be an 
inspiration for some. 
 
Conclusion 
 
As the corpus of articles on narrative in Medical Humanities Journal alone attests, the 
importance of narrative to the understanding and even treatment of illness should not 
be underestimated. Narrative, or, rather, the wealth of possible forms of storytelling and 
framing of experience brought together under its elusive sign, is a vehicle for 
foregrounding those qualities of personhood so often thought to be excluded from the 
narrow biomedical approach to medicine and disease [74, p. viii]. But it is not the only 
one. This paper has argued against the claim that “constituting an identity requires that 
an individual conceive of his [sic] life having the form and the logic of a story – more 
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specifically, the story of a person’s life – where ‘story’ is understood as a conventional, 
linear narrative” [75, p. 96, emphasis added], and the related idea that illness 
specifically calls for or requires stories [3, p. 2]. “Against Narrativity” makes a moral 
appeal to philosophers and, as I have suggested, scholars and practitioners in the 
medical humanities, to guard against “needlessly and wrongly distress[ing] those who 
do not fit their model.” If we limit ourselves to specific forms of narrative, and to 
narrativity per se, we run the risk of both isolating and distressing people, such as 
Strawson, who conceive of themselves as “Episodics,” and of shutting down the very 
diversity of perspectives and forms of self-expression it has long been the task of the 
humanities, arts and social sciences to argue are vital in the context of medicine and 
healthcare. 
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